Live from the Nuke Free Zone

One of the primary points of interest among current developments in the Iraq war is the arrival of a number of reports on the situation in Iraq, particularly on the levels of violence. Defenders of the surge strategy are expected to point to a drop in levels of violence as evidence that the surge is working, and use this conclusion to combat calls for withdrawal. I ran my own analysis of the data presented in this graphic, trying to determine what could be objectively said about the data as it was reported. The short summary is that the surge is not having much of an effect, whether you compare 2007 to previous years in absolute numbers or August to previous months in seasonally adjusted numbers. It may be fairly said that the benefits are negligible compared to the costs: the objective of “making space for political reconciliation” appears not to be yielding political reconciliations, and the broader strategic goal (for the invasion overall) of absolute reduction in terrorist activity, motivation, and recruitment appears to be completely unaddressed; absolute violence has been trending upward over the long term.

Category breakdown and data analysis below.

Car bomb attacks:

July August Change:
‘04: 8 5 -38%
‘05: 30 15 -50%
‘06: 43 31 -28%

‘07: 39 13 -67%

IED attacks:

July August Change
‘04: 80 130 +63%
‘05: 105 90 -14%
‘06: 210 190 -5%

‘07: 340 230 -33%

Mortar and rocket attacks:

July August Change
‘04: 110 330 +200%
‘05: 34 32 -6%
‘06: 115 85 -17%

‘07: 240 140 -42%

Civilian casualties:

July August Change
‘04: 400 650 +63%
‘05: 800 1100 +38%
‘06: 1700 1400 -18%

‘07: 1400 950 -32%

Absolute numbers:

The absolute level of reported incidents in each category except mortar and rocket attacks was higher in August of 2007 than it was in August of 2004, and roughly equal to or greater than the level from each category in August of 2005. Overall, a linear fit to each category’s August data shows a positive slope when all four years are taken into account, with the exception again of mortar and rocket attacks.

Seasonally adjusted numbers (August compared to July):

In 2004, all but car bomb statistics were on the rise. Except for the 2005 civilian casualties, August of 2005 and 2006 saw drops from the July numbers in all four categories of statistics reported. The drops in 2007 were proportionately larger than those of previous years.

In Summary:

Defenders of the surge will attempt to make hay of a drop in violence. Such a drop did occur in August. It must be understood in context of two facts: first, despite this drop, levels of violence remain high, higher than shortly after the invasion, and this is so even though troop levels during the surge (130,000) are comparable to those of 2004 (142,000). Second, August has generally been associated with a drop in violence, and September with a resumption of attacks, in each year and in each category. Questions have been raised as to how much of the drop in sectarian killings can be attributed to the surge, and how much to the segregation of Iraqi neighborhoods; we must also question how much is real compared to the seasonally adjusted trends. Some appears likely to be due to the increased force levels; but given the number of other factors likely to share responsibility, we must wonder whether the limited benefit is worth the intense cost America is bearing.

It is, of course, the Zone’s position that the answer is “no,” and Congress needs to codify this into law and move promptly to disengage America from Iraq, through whatever transition arrangements they care to set up. If this means leaving behind an Iraq that has divided itself along sectarian lines, that result would not appear to be a significant security threat to the United States.